APPROVAL OF ADOPTION OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION PLANS, 2004-2 (Mich. 2004)

No. ADM File No. 2004-04.Supreme Court of Michigan.
April 28, 2004.

Administrative Order No. 2003-1 and MCL 600.401 et seq.
authorize Michigan trial courts to adopt concurrent jurisdiction plans within a county or judicial circuit, subject to approval of the Court.

The Court hereby approves adoption of concurrent jurisdiction plans for the following trial courts effective August 1, 2004:

BARRY COUNTY
5th Circuit Court 56B District Court Barry County Probate Court
BERRIEN COUNTY
2nd Circuit Court 5th District Court Berrien County Probate Court
ISABELLA COUNTY
21st Circuit Court 76th District Court Isabella County Probate Court
LAKE COUNTY
51st Circuit Court 79th District Court Lake County Probate Court
WASHTENAW COUNTY
22nd Circuit Court 14A, 14B, 15th District Courts Washtenaw County Probate Court
CRAWFORD, KALKASKA, AND OTSEGO COUNTIES
46th Circuit Court 87th District Court Crawford County Probate Court Kalkaska County Probate Court Otsego County Probate Court

The plans shall remain on file with the state court administrator.

Amendments to concurrent jurisdiction plans may be implemented by local administrative order pursuant to MCR 8.112. Plan amendments shall conform to the requirements of Administrative Order No. 2003-1 and MCL 600.401 et seq.

The Court also rescinds Administrative Order Nos. 1993-3, 1996-1, 1996-2, 1996-5, 1996-6, 1996-7, 1996-9, and 1997-12, effective August 1, 2004.

Markman, J. (concurring).

On March 7, 2002, this Court wrote to the Speaker of the House, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Governor, and recommended the enactment of legislation “that would permit, consistent with the constitution, concurrent jurisdiction among the trial courts on a local option basis.”[1] In light of this correspondence, I wrote separately to these same persons, setting forth a series of constitutional inquiries that I thought would be helpful to the Legislature and the Governor in evaluating court reform proposals, including the proposal of this Court, and in determining whether such proposals were “consistent with the constitution.”[2]

When the House of Representatives subsequently enacted 2002 PA 678, a proposal restructuring the courts of this state, it apparently did so in light of at least some constitutional reservation because the House simultaneously requested an advisory opinion from this Court concerning the constitutionality of this enactment. Const 1963, art 3, § 8. Over my dissent, this Court denied the House of Representatives’ request without explanation. In re 2002 PA 678, 468 Mich. 1213 (2003).

Having first recommended a course of action to the Legislature, and then denied the House of Representatives’ request for an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of legislation enacted in response to this recommendation, this Court is now being asked to approve court reorganization plans adopted pursuant to this legislation. Because I see nothing inconsistent between this legislation and these reorganization plans, I concur in their approval. However, I reiterate what I stated in my dissent in In re 2002 PA 678, supra at 1216, “Before the highest court of this state exercises this newly authorized power [to approve court reorganization plans], it would be especially prudent for it first to evaluate whether it is exercising a power that is compatible with the constitution . . .” I continue to hold this view, and to believe that we erred in failing to grant the House of Representatives’ request for an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of 2002 PA 678.

As this Court is increasingly called upon to approve court reorganization plans, and as our imprimatur is increasingly placed upon such plans, as it is today, it will prove increasingly difficult for us to evaluate the constitutionality of 2002 PA 678 with the requisite detachment. The more this Court becomes a participant in the process of court reorganization, the more difficult it will become for us to resolve the constitutional issues inherent in the transformation of Michigan’s judicial system effected by 2002 PA 678.

It is my purpose neither to suggest that 2002 PA 678 is poorly advised nor that it is constitutionally infirm. It is merely to suggest that this Court erred in failing to address the constitutional concerns of the House of Representatives at a time when such concerns could have been addressed before this Court itself became a participant in the process of court reorganization. Rather than “demonstrating comity with the people’s representatives in the Legislature,” id. at 1216, we did nothing and thereby left “critical constitutional questions in limbo.” Id. at 1215. This Court can be assured, just as it could have been assured at the moment of enactment of 2002 PA 678, that constitutional challenges to this legislation will be forthcoming. Rather than resolving these challenges in a timely and orderly fashion, we have unwisely postponed their resolution and assured ourselves that the actions of this Court itself will be implicated in these challenges.