209 N.W.2d 506
Docket No. 14645.Michigan Court of Appeals.
Decided May 24, 1973.
Appeal from Monroe, William J. Weipert, Jr., J. Submitted Division 2 March 13, 1973, at Detroit. (Docket No. 14645.) Decided May 24, 1973.
Complaint by Rosemary L. Mentel against the Monroe Public Schools and Jay S. Peters for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
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Directed verdict and judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Maile, Leach Schreier, for the plaintiff.
William J. Braunlich, Jr., for the defendants.
Amicus Curiae: Clark, Klein, Winter, Parsons Prewitt (b H. William Butler and Pamela J. Liggett).
Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and V.J. BRENNAN and O’HARA,[*] JJ.
V.J. BRENNAN, J.
Plaintiff was operating her automobile as a part of a funeral procession when she sustained injuries as a result of a collision with defendant’s bus. The procession was proceeding from a funeral home to a church at the time of the accident; from the church, they were to proceed to a cemetery. The first several vehicles of the procession entered an intersection on a green light; plaintiff entered the intersection on a red light and struck defendant’s bus. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict on behalf of the defendant.
The trial court based its directed verdict on two grounds, both of which are challenged by the plaintiff. The first ground is that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law by entering the intersection against the traffic light because the statute gives a funeral procession the right of way only “when going to any place of burial”. MCLA 257.654; MSA 9.2354.
We disagree. “Burial” not only means “interment”, but also refers to “the act or ceremony of
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burying”.[1] A church where a funeral service is to be conducted is therefore a “place of burial” within the meaning of the statute.
Defendant also urged, and the trial court ruled, that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law because the funeral right of way statute[2] has no application at an intersection controlled by a traffic-control device[3] again, we must disagree. A “traffic-control device” refers to anything from a yield sign to a stop light.[4] To read the statute as the defendant and trial court do would be to make it applicable only at unmarked intersections; we feel such a reading unnecessarily restrictive. Furthermore, “In case of an inconsistency between them a special regulation relating to motor vehicles will prevail over a general one relating thereto.” 60 CJS Motor Vehicles, § 23, p 192. See also Linski v Employment Security Commission, 358 Mich. 239
(1959).
The trial court erred by ruling plaintiff was
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negligent as a matter of law. The statute granting the right of way to a funeral procession was applicable to the facts of this case. However, the fact that she apparently had the right of way does not absolve her from all duty of care. Garvit v Krebs, 338 Mich. 256 (1953).
Reversed and remanded.
All concurred.
“(b) Any person passing through a funeral procession of motor vehicles, designated as aforesaid with a vehicle of any kind, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” MCLA 257.654; MSA 9.2354.
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